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Using an experiment, we demonstrate that a communication
regime where a worker communicates about his intended effort is
less effective in i) soliciting truthful information, and ii) motivat-
ing effort, than a regime where he communicates about his past
effort. Our experiment uses a real-effort task, which additionally
allows us to demonstrate the effects of communication on effort
over time. We show that the timing of communication affects
the dynamic pattern of work. In both treatments, individuals are
most cooperative closest to the time of communication. Our re-
sults reveal that the timing of communication is a critical feature
that merits attention in the design of mechanisms for information
transmission in strategic settings.
JEL: C72, C91, D83
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Across a wide range of settings, agents take actions which are not observable
by their strategic counterparts. In these situations, the interacting parties often
communicate to overcome the informational asymmetry that results from hidden
action. Over the last decade, a large literature has analyzed these environments
focusing on the effect of pre-play communication on static choices. These papers
have established that statements of intent or non-binding promises can be infor-
mative and increase cooperation in social dilemmas (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Miettinen and Suetens, 2008; Vanberg, 2008; Van den Assem, Van Dolder
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2and Thaler, 2012; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2016; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2017). Two
theories have been proposed to explain such behavior—belief-dependent utility
where individuals incur costs for failing to meet the raised expectations created
in the promisee (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2016),
and preference for consistency between one’s action and his message (Vanberg,
2008).
However, many interesting and economically-relevant interactions don’t fall into
the realm of environments that the literature addresses. Communication does not
always occur pre-play, nor does it necessarily surround static choices. Communi-
cation is inherently dynamic and can happen before or after an individual makes a
decision. For instance, contractors make informal commitments to use high qual-
ity materials before commencing a project, while sellers advertise their investment
in quality only after production.1 In contrast to the breadth of evidence we have
accumulated about the incentive effects of ex-ante communication, we know little
about whether these positive effects hold to the same extent when individuals an-
ticipate the opportunity to communicate ex-post.2 Additionally, communication
often surrounds decisions which unfold piecewise over time. For example, compa-
nies commit to reduce emissions over the course of a year or set public targets to
improve energy efficiency by a future date. The effect of communication in these
environments may differ from that of communicating about immediate decisions.
To capture these two previously under-studied aspects of communication, we
design a two-person hidden action game that can be interpreted as a manager-
worker interaction. Workers make non-binding statements about their effort ei-
ther before or after working on a real-effort task for the manager. We study
the degree of truthful reporting, workers’ effort exerted, and managers’ behavior
across these two communication frameworks.
Our experiment builds on the previous literature in a few key ways. First,
we analyze and compare the efficacy of ex-ante and ex-post communication in
transmitting information and encouraging cooperation in strategic environments.
We will refer to this as the effect across time. Second, within each treatment,
we explore how cooperation evolves in relation to the distance in time from when
1Interactions in these environments could occur repeatedly. To isolate the aspect of timing on pref-
erences for truth-telling, this paper considers a one-shot environment.
2In a notable paper Brandts, Ellman and Charness (2016) introduce a rich communication framework
where buyers and sellers can communicate over the planning as well as execution period to establish
informal contracts.
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communication occurs. We will refer to this as the effect over time.
In our experiment, the worker exerts effort on a project and the manager chooses
whether or not to invest in the project. Effort is costly for the worker but increases
the manager’s expected payoff from investing. The worker does not get paid
directly for working on the project, but receives a fixed payment if the manager
invests. The worker’s effort on the project is unobservable to the manager, and
the manager has to rely on the worker’s communication about his effort level in
determining whether to invest. Our treatments vary when this communication
opportunity is presented to workers: either before or after the worker exerts
effort. In the Message Before treatment, the worker’s message takes the form of
a statement of intent or “promise,” where the worker communicates about the
effort he plans to exert on the project. In the Message After treatment, he sends
a message or “report” only after he finishes working.
We design our game such that a self-interested worker with no costs of decep-
tion will have no incentive to work on the project. However, since he receives a
positive payoff when the manager invests, he will want to convince the manager
that sufficiently high effort has been (or will be) exerted to make the manager’s
investment profitable. Our game captures many of the relevant features of strate-
gic environments with misaligned incentives. It is in these environments where we
expect deception to be most prevalent and also where communication can have
the greatest impact in facilitating cooperation.
In order to observe how effort evolves over time, we implement the worker’s
effort decision through a real-effort task. The worker is given four minutes to
work on converting letters to numbers. We track his effort over the entire span
of the Work Stage. This allows us to explore how cooperation changes as the
worker gets further from the time when he sent his message in the Message Before
treatment or gets closer to the time of sending the message in the Message After
treatment.
Comparing messages to the actual effort exerted, we find messages sent in the
Message Before treatment inflate effort by 81% while those sent in the Message
After treatment inflate by only 41%. Not only do more workers deceive in the
Message Before treatment, but the magnitude of the deception is also greater.
The observed difference in informational content is driven both by workers com-
municating higher effort and exerting less effort in the Message Before treatment
compared to the Message After treatment. On average, managers anticipate that
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4messages will be inflated and as a result expect a lower level of effort than what is
stated in the messages. Additionally, we find that managers partially anticipate
the impact of the timing of communication on deception.
Looking at the dynamic allocation of effort, we find that the highest effort is
exerted closest to the time of communication in both treatments. In the Message
Before treatment, the highest percentage of workers work at the beginning of
the Work Stage, while in the Message After treatment, the highest percentage of
workers are working at the end. To our knowledge, this is the first study that
explores the effects of communication over time, and our results suggest that
cooperation may be highest when messages are at the top-of-mind.
As further evidence and an exercise in robustness, we explore the effect of timing
of communication in a binary matrix game designed to be strategically similar
to the manager-worker environment. As in the real-effort task, the sender can
signal his action to the receiver through a message. Treatments vary when the
sender can send the message, either before or after he takes his action. Behavior
in the matrix game largely confirms our main results. We find a higher frequency
of deceptive signals when the sender can signal before compared to after. Results
from the matrix games and additional analysis allow us to eliminate a number
of potential explanations of our results, including inaccuracy in predicting future
performance, manager expectations, and moral wiggle room. Instead, we posit
intrinsic differences in costs of deception between these two environments.
Our results reveal new insights regarding intrinsic preferences for honesty. In
particular, we show that timing of communication is a critical factor in deter-
mining deception and cooperation, and therefore can be an important variable
in the hands of the contract designer. There are many situations where timing
of communication is a variable of interest. Capital budgeting decisions are often
based on unverifiable information which is solicited at one of two points in time
(Arya et al., 2000): Divisions of a firm receive funding by self-reporting either
on the anticipated expenses of projects (Church, Hannan and Kuang, 2012) or
on realized expenses after production (Fellingham and Young, 1990). Our re-
sults suggest that firms could choose a late information system to facilitate more
truthful reporting and more efficient spending. In a simple organizational de-
sign problem, managers could schedule weekly meetings at the end of the week
where employees talk about the week’s progress versus goal-setting meetings held
at the start of the week. Additionally, corporate social responsibility statements
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are used by interest groups and society at large to form an idea of a company’s
contribution to society, however the reporting is largely voluntary and unregu-
lated in most countries. Companies often have been found to misreport existing
standards as well as overstate future environmental goals to build brand image
(Cohen, 2011; Ward, 2014). Our results indicate that the form of reporting—as
a statement of goals or report on achievements—could have implications for the
accuracy of these statements.
I. Related Literature
Our paper contributes most directly to the literature on strategic communica-
tion. Theoretical and experimental work in strategic communication has followed
two largely separate strands: communication regarding an exogenous state of
the world as in the sender-receiver games (a` la Crawford and Sobel, 1982) and
pre-play communication regarding future decisions.
In sender-receiver games, an individual has private information about an exter-
nal state of the world and may convey the information through a message. An
uninformed strategic counterpart then may take an action after observing this
message. Experiments in this paradigm focus explicitly on the degree of honest
reporting by the informed agent and how credible the uninformed agent consid-
ers the message to be (Gneezy, 2005; Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Cai and
Wang, 2006). Their findings are consistent with individuals showing an aversion
to misreporting, as most subjects sacrifice substantial payoff gains and do not
misreport maximally. Similar results are observed in related papers where indi-
viduals report on an outcome of chance, e.g. rolling a die or tossing a coin (Abeler,
Becker and Falk, 2014; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013), and in papers where
individuals self-report on past performance in simple tasks or contribution games
(Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008; Shu et al., 2012; Brosig, Margreiter and Weimann,
2005).3 These experiments convincingly establish the existence of costs of mis-
representation as individuals are unwilling to make false statements, even at the
expense of large monetary gains.
The second strand of literature investigates the effect of pre-play communication
in social dilemmas (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Miettinen
3In these papers, subjects were not aware of the reporting opportunity when completing the task or
making contribution decisions. As a result, their message became akin to reporting on an exogenous
state as the outcome had already been determined.
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6and Suetens, 2008; Van den Assem, Van Dolder and Thaler, 2012) and coordina-
tion games (Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000). In these games, players make
non-binding commitments about their future actions. In contrast to the sender-
receiver literature, subjects in these experiments make two decisions: i) what
message to send and ii) what action to take. These papers confirm the conclusion
drawn above, that individuals are averse to misrepresentation and do not take the
opportunity to misreport maximally. As a result, pre-play statements of intent
are informative. This literature additionally demonstrates that statements of in-
tent increase cooperation. Communication increases expectations in the receiver,
and senders change their actions in conjunction with these raised expectations.
As a result, overall cooperation rates increase compared to a baseline without
communication.
Our paper bridges the gap between these two strands of literature and extends
analysis into new domains. We analyze truth-telling and cooperation, directly
comparing strategic environments with ex-ante statements of intent to those with
ex-post reporting. To date, there has been limited research on how ex-post reports
can be used to influence decisions and increase cooperation, which has been the
main focus of the pre-play communication literature. Additionally, we extend
both literatures into a richer decision domain. Rather than focusing on static
decisions, we analyze a dynamic real-effort environment that allows us to look at
cooperation rates over time.
We are not the first paper to directly compare ex-ante and ex-post communica-
tion. A small literature has studied the role of timing of communication in stag
hunt games. In an early influential paper, Farrell (1988) conjectures that ex-ante,
but not ex-post, communication will allow agents to coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium in the stag hunt game. Given the structure of the stag hunt game,
the sender always prefers the receiver hunt the stag. Therefore, after taking ei-
ther action, the sender would always signal for the receiver to hunt the stag and
his message is entirely uninformative. However, if the sender can communicate
before taking an action, he might choose to hunt the stag, too, if he believes his
message will be influential over the receiver’s choice. Hence, ex-ante communica-
tion can facilitate coordination. Charness (2000) provides experimental support
for Farrell’s conjecture. Recently, two interesting papers have provided different
approaches to formalize Farrell’s conjecture. Zultan (2013) uses a dual self model,
where the “acting self” (who takes an action) and the “signalling self” (who com-
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municates) are treated as separate entities. Schlag and Vida (2015) provide a
more general framework to analyze cheap talk surrounding play of games with
multiple equilibria. While this literature highlights the importance of timing of
communication in strategic interactions, it concentrates on games with multiple
equilibria and focuses on the role of timing in equilibrium selection. In our en-
vironment, there is a single equilibrium and therefore timing of communication
should be irrelevant theoretically.
The paper most closely related to our work is that of Serra-Garcia, Van Damme
and Potters (2013). In a clever experiment, they show that individuals are much
more willing to lie about a state of nature than about their action, even when these
statements lead to the same outcome for a strategic counterpart. The authors
suggest that the difference can be attributed to communication about actions hav-
ing an inherent “promise” element, which messages about pre-determined states
of nature do not. To test this, in a secondary treatment they allow subjects to
communicate about their own past actions and compare this to communication
about current actions.4 They find support for the claim that statements about
current actions in particular increase cooperation. Our work attempts to build on
their findings by exploring the impact of timing in a unified framework expressly
aimed at answering the question of whether ex-ante versus ex-post communication
affects behavior differently. Furthermore, our use of a real-effort task completed
over time allows us to explore a richer set of results. In particular, we study
the impact of communication over the duration of the real-effort task and how
this interacts with the timing of communication. We also analyze several other
games as robustness checks, varying payoffs and the degree of alignment in payoff
incentives.
II. Experimental Design
We conduct a between-subject analysis of two separate treatments. In the
Message Before treatment (hereafter MB), an individual sends a message about
an action he will take in the future. In the Message After (MA) treatment,
an individual sends a message about his action only after he has taken it. We
begin by outlining the structure and payoffs of the game, which we will call The
4In their treatment where subjects communicate about current actions, Serra-Garcia, Van Damme
and Potters (2013) present action and message decisions to subjects on the same screen, so decisions were
essentially simultaneous rather than sequential and it’s unclear which question subjects answer first.
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8Manager-Worker Game.
A. The Manager-Worker Game
The game we design is a two-player hidden action game. For simplicity of
exposition, we will call the players manager and worker.5 The manager has to
decide whether to invest (I=1) in a project, which we will call the Joint Project.
The return on her investment depends upon the outcome of the Joint Project,
θ, which could either be a success (θ = S) or a failure (θ = F ). The manager’s
payoffs are denoted by piM in Eq (1). The manager receives 130 points if the
Joint Project is successful and she invests. If the project fails and she invests, she
receives 10 points. If she does not invest, she receives an outside option which
pays her 70 points.6 The payoffs ensure that the manager will find it profitable
to invest only when the project is successful.
(1) piM =

130 points if θ = S and I = 1
10 points if θ = F and I = 1
70 points if I = 0
The outcome of the Joint Project, in turn, depends on the worker’s real-effort
on the Joint Project. The amount worked on the Joint Project determines the
probability of success. Denoting the worker’s effort on the Joint Project by wJ ,
the outcome function, p, is




This function is monotonic, concave and bounded above at 1.7 Hence, the more
the worker works, the higher the chance that the project will be successful, but
he can never guarantee its success with certainty. The worker completes work on
5During the experiment we use neutral language and refer to the players as Player A and Player B.
6All experimental points were converted into dollar payments at the end of the session, at a rate of
10 points = 1 USD.
7The specific functional form was chosen so that an average worker could guarantee roughly 80%
chance of success if he works for all 4 minutes. We calibrated this from an incentivized pilot session.
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the Joint Project prior to the manager making her investment decision. However,
at the time of investment, the manager does not observe the outcome of the Joint
Project or the amount of work done. The worker can send a non-binding message,
m ∈ [0,∞), informing the manager of his level of work on the Joint Project.
Since our primary focus is on deceptive behavior, the worker’s payoffs were set
up such that a self-interested worker will find it beneficial to overstate his work in
the message. To make it costly for the worker to work on the Joint Project, the
worker has an outside option, called the Personal Project, that he could work on
instead. Working on the Personal Project pays the worker directly. If the worker
completes wP tasks for the Personal Project, he earns
wP
wP+23
× 100 points.8 In
addition to his earnings from the Personal Project, he receives a fixed payment
of 120 points if the manager invests in the Joint Project. If the manager does
not invest, he receives only his earnings from the Personal Project. The worker is
given four minutes to divide his time between working on the two projects. The





Note from Eq (3) that the worker’s earnings do not depend directly on how
much he has worked for the Joint Project or on its outcome. This ensures that,
for a self-interested worker with no other-regarding preferences and no cost of
deception, any strategy in which the worker devotes positive time to the Joint
Project is strictly dominated; he will devote all his time to the Personal Project.
Anticipating this, the manager should never invest, regardless of the message
sent by the worker. Hence, the theoretical prediction for self-interested players
with no cost of deception is that the worker does not work on the Joint Project
and the manager does not invest. The above equilibrium outcome is inefficient
and is Pareto dominated by outcomes where a risk-neutral manager invests and
the worker works sufficiently on the Joint Project to ensure at least 50% chance
of the project being successful. If individuals are other-regarding or incur costs
from deceiving, there could exist equilibria with positive levels of work done for
8We use the same functional form for the Personal Project payoff and the Joint Project success
function because we wanted to remove anchoring effects which may make subjects lean towards working
on one project over the other.
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the Joint Project and positive levels of investment.9 However, the theoretical
predictions would be the same for MB as for MA.10
We implement the worker’s decision to work on the two projects with a real-
effort task that lasts four minutes. The task chosen was the Encoding Task, which
we describe below.
B. Encoding Task
The real-effort task consisted of converting letters into numbers (Erkal, Gangad-
haran and Nikiforakis, 2011; Charness, Masclet and Villeval, 2014). The workers’
screen displayed a table with two rows. The first row contained all of the letters in
the alphabet and the second row provided a number (from 1–26 in random order)
to go along with each letter. During the task, participants were given a letter
and had to enter the corresponding number from the table. Once a participant
successfully converted a letter, the table would reset, matching each letter with a
new number and presenting the participant with another letter to encode and so
on. We use the number of letters encoded for each project as a measure of work
done for that project. To limit a potential source of variation across subjects, all
individuals faced the same order of letters to be encoded.
The Work Stage lasted four minutes, during which workers encoded letters for
the two projects. The workers began the work stage by choosing which project to
start working on.11 Thereafter, workers could decide in real-time which project
they wanted work to go towards. A button on the screen allowed workers to
switch between working for the two projects at any time. The dynamic nature of
this setup allows us to measure work over time and patterns of work allocation
between the two projects. To help workers keep track of their performance, there
were counters on the screen which displayed the current number of letters they had
encoded for each project. A screen shot of the work-stage is shown in Appendix
Figure A1.
9There could be many motivations for a person to be unwilling to deceive, including belief-dependent
guilt-aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli, Charness and Dufwenberg, 2013), fixed cost
of being inconsistent (Vanberg, 2008), or aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005).
10Theoretical predictions taking into account other-regarding preferences and preferences for honesty
would depend on many variables, such as preference parameters, distribution of types in the population,
fraction of naive managers, etc. But unless one or more of these variables is assumed to differ across
treatments, the predictions for MB and MA would be equivalent. Given that we do see empirical
differences between MA and MB, it would be interesting for future research to isolate and measure these
parameters independently and compare across timing of communication.
11To avoid framing effects, the order of these buttons was randomized on their screens.
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C. Treatments
We consider treatments that differ according to when the communication oppor-
tunity is presented to workers. In the MB treatment, the worker sends a message
prior to the Work Stage. In the MA treatment, the worker sends a message after
completing the Work Stage. We refer to this message sending opportunity as the
Message Stage. Table 1 lists the message options available to workers in either
treatment.
Table 1—: Message Options
Message After (MA) Message Before (MB)
i) Hi, I have encoded letters for
the Joint Project. You should in-
vest.
Hi, I will encode letters for
the Joint Project. You should in-
vest.
ii) Hi, I have encoded letters for
the Joint Project. You should not
invest.
Hi, I will encode letters for
the Joint Project. You should not
invest.
iii) No message No message
If a worker chose message option (i) or (ii), he could fill in any non-negative
number in the blank. It was stated in the instructions, as well as on subjects’
screens, that workers were free to choose any number and managers would only
see the message, never the actual number of letters encoded for the Joint Project.
The messages also contained a recommended action for the manager to eliminate
any ambiguity about whether the worker intended for the manager to rely on his
message.
It’s worth a brief aside to discuss our form of communication. A robust find-
ing in the literature is that free-form messages are more effective than fixed-form
messages in increasing cooperation (Charness, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2000; Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, 2010; Brandts, Ellman and Charness, 2016).12 Message
12Our message space is slightly richer than a yes-no check box used in these papers. When sending
a message, subjects choose any number to state in their messages, making the range of promises and
reports large. Since the subjects are free to choose any number, there is no clear ‘expected’ message like
in a bare promise. Bare promises run the risk that sending a promise is simply expected by everyone
(in fact, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that bare promises anchor responses on the rule), but there is no one
message in our design that carries this expectation. So while we use pre-specified messages, subjects
did have many available message options. But our message space certainly lacks the personal elements
present in free-form communication.
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language is an important part of communication, and adopting a limited message
space runs the risk of excluding key features that make communication more ef-
fective. However, the dynamic nature of our design and the relation of effort to
success probability would have provided workers with many possible dimensions
over which to communication. When allowed to converse freely, they may com-
municate about the level of work, the corresponding probability, or even about
time allocation. Given our research question, we wanted the worker to commu-
nicate about only the work done and hence needed to restrict the message space
for clean comparisons.13 Previous research has shown free-form messages to be
more informative than pre-specified messages in the domain of ex-ante promises
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010) as well as ex-post reports (Lundquist et al.,
2009; Khalmetski and Tirosh, 2012). Hence, we expect free-form communication
to increase trust and cooperation in both treatments, but its effect on treatment
differences is unclear. It remains an interesting open question to understand
whether free-form communication would differ in these two environments.
The manager made her investment decision after the Work and Message Stages
in both treatments. Note that even though the manager receives the message
before the Work Stage in the MB treatment, she makes her investment decision
only after the worker finishes working. Therefore, in both treatments the timing
of when a manager invests is the same.14 The treatments are identical in all
aspects other than the sequence in which the Message and the Work Stage were
presented.
We also collected beliefs from the workers and managers about their counter-
parts’ actions. The managers were asked to guess the number of letters encoded
by the worker for (i) the Joint Project and (ii) both projects in total. The workers
were asked to state their second-order beliefs by guessing the managers’ answer
to (i). The elicitation of beliefs was incentivized by the quadratic scoring rule.15
13Previous research has shown that the object of communication affects the cost of lying. Misreport-
ing is lower when individuals communicate about their effort versus private information (Serra-Garcia,
Van Damme and Potters, 2013) and the monetary value of effort (Desai and Kouchaki, 2015).
14While this may seem a bit unnatural in the MB treatment, research on epistemic versus aleatory
uncertainty suggests that individuals treat unknowable uncertainty differently from uncertainty that is
due to one’s lack of knowledge but theoretically discoverable (Rothbart and Snyder, 1970). To avoid
such confounds affecting the manager’s investment decision, we keep the timing of investment the same
across treatments.
15Belief elicitation was done only after actions were taken. In the instructions, subjects were told that
there would be a bonus stage where they could earn additional points, but weren’t told any details about
the questions they would be asked.
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D. Ability Measure
In most organic communication environments, it is difficult to disentangle in-
tentional deception from unintentional broken promises due to forecast errors.
Part of our motivation in using a lab experiment is to separate these two effects.
Since future uncertainty is an important consideration in applying results out-
side of the lab, we leave room for unintentional misrepresentation to enter our
environment while taking care to separate this effect from intentional deception.
In our experiment, unintentional misrepresentation could arise from forecast
errors if workers are overconfident about their abilities. These forecast errors
could affect behavior differently across treatments. For example, an overconfident
worker in the MB treatment might be unable to accomplish the work stated in
his message and would appear dishonest even if he did not intend to be. Such
considerations do not arise in the MA treatment since the worker sends a message
only after he has worked. In our experiment, we’ll address this by both reducing
and measuring forecast errors.
First, to mitigate miscalibration, we introduced an additional part, which we
call Part 1, before participants were introduced to the manager-worker game. In
Part 1, every participant worked on the Encoding Task for four minutes. The
first minute was an unincentivized practice round to familiarize subjects with
the task and interface. In the next three minutes, participants again worked on
the task, but this time were paid for the number of letters they encoded. The
payment scheme used was identical to the participants’ payoff from the Personal
Project to maintain parity in incentives. If a participant encoded w letters in
three minutes, his payoff was given by ww+23100 points. At the end of the three
minutes, participants saw a minute-by-minute breakdown of their performance,
providing them with feedback on their ability. Their performance in this part
also provides us with a baseline measure of their ability on the task.
Additionally, after participants viewed their performance, we collected data on
their projections of how many letters they would be able to encode if they had to
perform the task again, this time for four minutes.16 Comparing this forecast with
16The elicitation was not incentivized to avoid moral hazard problems. In general the literature offers
support for the idea that beliefs should be paid for using incentive-compatible mechanisms (Schotter and
Trevino, 2014). In eliciting the forecast, we faced a trade-off—incentivizing the accuracy of the forecast
may have led to a distortion of the effort in Part 2 of the experiment. As a precaution, we specifically
looked out for real-effort tasks where monetary incentives may matter less. We chose the encoding task as
Clark and Friesen (2009) elicit forecasts of future performance in the encoding task using small incentives
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their performance in Part 2, we can investigate whether forecast errors contribute
to any observed treatment differences we find.
Figure 1. : Timeline of Decisions
E. Implementation and Feedback
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the experiment. Participants were first read the
instructions for Part 1. After the four minutes in Part 1 and the performance
forecast elicitation, we handed out instructions for Part 2. Participants were either
assigned the role of a worker or the role of a manager. They played the game only
once, so our design captures a one-shot interaction. Since our primary interest
is in understanding the behavior of the workers, we randomized approximately
three quarters of the participants in a session to be workers and the remaining
participants to be managers.17 Consequently, a manager may have been matched
and no incentives and find no difference in participants’ forecast accuracy in the encoding task. All other
beliefs in our experiment were properly incentivized.
17Specifically, we randomized subjects into groups of four, with one subject as the manager and the
other three as the worker. In four sessions, we did not have an even multiple of four subjects and had
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with more than one worker; she made separate decisions for every worker and one
of the decisions was chosen randomly for payment. Instructions were read aloud
using slide illustrations as an aid, followed by a comprehension quiz to ensure
understanding of the game (see Appendix C).
After Part 2, subjects participated in a series of matrix games which we call
Part 3. Subjects did not receive any feedback about Part 2 before starting Part
3. These matrix games act as a robustness check for our main treatment and we
defer the description of this part to Section IV.B.
At the end of the experiment, one part was chosen randomly and participants
were paid their earnings for that part. All participants were informed about the
outcomes of the Joint Projects and the workers were informed of the managers’
investment decisions. The managers only got to know whether their Joint Project
was a success or not; they never got to know the number of letters the worker
encoded for the Joint Project.
F. Procedures
All experiments were computerized, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 16 ses-
sions (8 sessions per treatment) were conducted at the Ohio State Experimen-
tal Economics Lab, with a total of 284 participants recruited through ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). We had 111 participants as workers in the MB treatment and
100 participants as workers in the MA treatment. We had 37 and 36 participants
in the role of manager in the MB and MA treatments respectively. Each session
lasted about 90 minutes and the average payment to a subject was $15.
III. Results
The vast majority of workers—102 workers (92%) in the MB treatment and 88
workers (88%) in the MA treatment—sent a message recommending investment.
Our primary analysis and all tables and figures will focus on these 190 workers,
unless noted otherwise.18 For comparisons of raw data across treatments, we
a remainder of two additional subjects. In this case, one of those subjects was a worker and one was a
manager. So in these four instances, a manager was matched to only one worker. All other managers
were matched with exactly three workers.
18We analyze only these workers to begin with since our main focus is on deception, which is only
applicable when workers do send a message. There are no significant differences in the frequency of
message categories selected across treatments.
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report p-values from two-tailed Fisher-Pitman permutation tests for two inde-
pendent samples for non-binary data and two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for
binary data.
Recall that participants in both treatments completed three minutes of the En-
coding Task before they were presented with instructions for Part 2. Though
performance varies across participants, as expected there is no difference in the
average number of letters encoded in Part 1 across the two treatments. Partic-
ipants encoded 62.4 and 62.5 letters on average in the MB and MA treatment,
respectively (p-value=0.69). Figure A2 in the Appendix illustrates the distribu-
tion of ability across treatments. The number of letters participants encoded in
the three minutes serves as a measure of a subject’s ability in the effort task and
will be included in all subsequent regressions along with a dummy for gender,
a dummy for native language, year-of-study dummies, and a dummy indicating
whether the participant is a graduate student.
A. Informativeness of Messages
We first present results on the information content of the messages. For ease of
exposition, we will refer to messages sent in the MB treatment as “promises” and
messages in the MA treatment as “reports,” with “message” being an overarching
term across both treatments. A message is fully informative if the stated number
of letters in the message is equal to the actual number of letters encoded by the
worker for the Joint Project (m − wJ = 0). If m − wJ 6= 0, a worker is said
to misinform the manager. If m − wJ > 0, the message is inflated, while if
m−wJ < 0, the message is conservative. The dependent variable in our analysis
is m− wJ , a measure of message inflation.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative density of misinformation by treatment. First,
the wedge in the distributions at zero indicates that fewer workers inflate their
messages in the MA than in the MB treatment. The CDF of the MA treatment
always lies above that of the MB treatment for positive values of misinforma-
tion, indicating greater misinformation in the latter. Aggregate statistics confirm
these observations. The average amount of misinformation in MB is 32.1 letters
compared to only 17.9 letters in MA (p-value=0.002; K-S p-value=0.002). Thus,
on average, messages are 79% more inflated in the MB treatment. This is robust
to considering other measures of message inflation.
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Figure 2. : Distribution of Misinformation by Treatment
To formalize our findings, Table 2 Column (1) presents results from an OLS
regression predicting the amount of message inflation after controlling for ability
and demographic characteristics. Message Before is a dummy equal to 1 for the
MB treatment and 0 for the MA treatment. Part 1 Performance is the number
of letters the participant encoded in Part 1 of the experiment, which we use as a
measure of the worker’s ability on the task. Column (1) confirms that the amount
of misinformation is significantly higher in the MB treatment.
Uncertain Future. — There is an obvious reason why promises might overstate
work more than reports. In the MB treatment, workers send a message before
they work, and the higher misinformation in the MB treatment may reflect work-
ers incorrectly forecasting the number of letters they will be able to encode.19
Overconfidence might prompt them to send ambitious messages and may lead to
work unintentionally falling short of the promised amount. Workers in the MA
19It’s possible that miscalibration can work in the opposite direction, as well, and we do find a positive
fraction of workers with conservative messages in the MB treatment. We discuss this in Section B.B1 of
the Appendix, but it is important to note that since misinformation is higher in the MB treatment, such
conservative messages only bring down the average message inflation in the MB treatment.
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Table 2—: Message Inflation
Dependent variable: m− wJ
(1) (2) (3)
Message Before 14.61*** 17.18*** 10.67**
(4.20) (4.11) (5.31)




Overestimate*Message Before 1.27** 1.05
(0.54) (0.67)
Constant 1.19 -4.99 -4.68
(16.73) (17.65) (21.61)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 190 190 128
R-Squared 0.05 0.12 0.17
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
Controls include a dummy for gender, a dummy for native language, year-of-study dummies
and a dummy for being a graduate student. Message Before is a treatment dummy variable
(1=MB, 0=MA), Part 1 Performance is a subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration, and
Overestimate is the measure of forecast error. Column (3) conditions on workers who sent
inflated messages.
treatment would be unaffected by miscalibration, as they send a message after
working and therefore know their true performance when sending their message.
Our design allows us to test for this explanation, and we will demonstrate that
higher misinformation in the MB treatment cannot be attributed to uncertainty
surrounding future ability.
Recall that after the participants viewed their Part 1 performance results but
prior to receiving instructions for Part 2, they were asked to forecast the number
of letters they would encode if they performed again for four minutes. We use
this forecast, wˆtotal, as a measure of the worker’s ex-ante beliefs of the total
number of letters he can encode in Part 2. A promisor overestimates if wˆtotal −
wtotal > 0, where wtotal is the actual number of letters encoded in four minutes
for both projects. For these promisors who overestimated, we add the number of
letters they fell short by to the work done on the Joint Project and recalculate
misinformation.
(4) MisinformationAdj = m− (wJ + (wˆtotal − wtotal))
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This adjustment assumes the following—if an overconfident promisor hypotheti-
cally could accomplish what he anticipated when sending the message, we assume
he would have encoded all the letters he fell short by for the Joint Project. In
reality, we do not know what he would have done; he could have encoded all for
the Personal Project or split them between the Joint and Personal Projects. We
make the most conservative assumption that he would have encoded these addi-
tional letters all for the Joint Project, thereby giving promisors the best chance
at being honest. After this adjustment, the average amount of misinformation
in MB falls from 32.1 to 29.5 letters, but is still significantly higher than the
17.9 letters in MA (p-value=0.009).20 Hence, we find that forecast errors cannot
account for the difference in information transmitted across the treatments.21
To test whether forecast errors affect misinformation more generally, we aug-
ment the regression in Table 2 with (wˆtotal −wtotal), which we call Overestimate,
and the interaction of Overestimate and Message Before. We include the inter-
action of Overestimate and Message Before on the basis of our hypothesis that
initial forecast errors would have no effect on the amount of misinformation in
the MA treatment as workers send a message after observing their actual perfor-
mance. However, forecast errors may affect the amount of misinformation in the
MB treatment as workers send a message ex-ante. Column (2) reports results.
Our hypothesis is supported by the observation that the combined magnitude
of the coefficient on the interaction and Overestimate is positive and significant.
Overestimation by 1 letter results in roughly 0.9 letters of inflation.
More crucially, the coefficient on the treatment variable is unaffected after con-
trolling for overestimation. Thus, the difference in misinformation across treat-
ments is not being driven by forecast errors. We deliberately designed our ex-
periment to allow for future uncertainty and unintentional misrepresentation to
enter into our game since these forces are relevant in many communication envi-
ronments. We see that future uncertainty does lead to higher misinformation in
MB compared to MA, though the overall magnitude of this effect is small in our
domain. Column (3) reports the same regression conditioning on workers who
sent inflated messages, leaving out all conservative and fully informative mes-
20Appendix Figure A3 illustrates this in the distribution of misinformation after this calibration.
21In fact, as Appendix Table A1 shows, the workers’ predicted (wˆtotal) and actual performance (wtotal)
in Part 2 are very close on average, deviating by only ≈ 2 letters. We find nearly 50% of the workers
have an individual forecast error of less than equal to 5 letters and 70% predict performance within an
interval of 10% of their actual performance. Hence, our training helped calibrate the subjects about their
ability on average.
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sages. It shows that higher misinformation in the MB treatment isn’t driven only
by a larger number of workers lying, but also by the fact that lies are of greater
magnitude than in the MA treatment.
Overall, we conclude that misinformation is significantly higher in the MB treat-
ment than in the MA treatment.
Result 1: Individuals are more dishonest when they speak of their future ac-
tions than when they report on past actions.
In the next two sections, we break down misinformation into its two components—
message and action—and show that both are responsible for the observed differ-
ence in behavior.
B. Effort
The total number of letters encoded by workers for both projects combined
is identical across treatments (an average of 87.6 letters in the MB treatment
and 86.8 letters in the MA treatment, p-value=0.65). This is expected since
there is no difference in the ability to encode across treatments as measured by
their Part 1 performance. If workers had allocated all their work to the Joint
Project, this would translate to a 78.9 percent and 78.8 percent chance of the Joint
Project being successful in the MB and MA treatment, respectively. However,
most workers distribute their time working across both projects; hence, the mean
number of letters encoded for the Joint Project and the corresponding probability
of success are considerably lower.22
Allocation of Effort Over Time. — Recall that a worker decides which project
he wants to start working on and can switch between working on his two projects
any number of times during the Work Stage. Figure 3 illustrates the fraction
of workers working on the Joint Project at every point in time in the Work
Stage. We find that the temporal distribution of work is different between the
two treatments. When the Work Stage begins, around 50% of workers start by
working on the Joint Project, and this does not differ across treatments. As time
elapses, this fraction shows a significant downward trend in the MB treatment
(p-value<0.001), while in the MA treatment, this fraction increases over time (p-
2270% of workers work on both projects, 18% work only on the Personal Project and 12% work on
only the Joint Project.
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Figure 3. : Temporal Distribution of Work on the Joint Project
value<0.001).23 This leads to 55% of workers in the MA treatment allocating
more than half their time to working on the Joint Project, while only 40% do so
in the MB (p-value=0.03).24
We find that, in both treatments, the highest fraction of workers work on the
Joint Project closest to the time of sending the message. In the MB treatment,
work on the Joint Project is highest in the first quarter of the work stage, while
in the MA treatment work is highest in the last quarter of the work stage. This
suggests that the moral cost of sending a false message may be at the “top-of-
mind” closest to the time of sending the message, and may motivate the worker
to work on the Joint Project.
The dynamic nature of our task also provides an interesting insight on worker
23In the first half of the work stage, the fraction of workers working on the Joint Project falls in
both treatments (p-value<0.001). However, while in the second half this fraction continues to show a
downward trend in MB (p-value=0.001) it increases in the MA treatment (p-value<0.001). The increase
in the number of workers working on the Joint Project in the second half is so strong that over the entire
work stage of 4 minutes we observe an upward trend in the MA treatment. All p-values are calculated
from regressions with fraction of workers who work on the Joint Project as the dependent variable and
time elapsed in the work stage as an independent variable.
24It is possible that the decline in the fraction of promisors working on the Joint Project over time
results from demotivated promisors who realize they cannot achieve the promised amount. We do not find
evidence of this. Figure A4 in the Appendix shows a similar trend when conditioning only on promisors
who were able to encode the promised amount.
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“type.” Across both treatments, we find those workers who start with the Joint
Project encode nearly three times as much for the Joint Project as those who
start with the Personal Project (57 letters vs 20 letters, p-value <0.001). Hence,
initial choice of project is a good indicator of future behavior. In the Appendix,
we present a number of secondary results on workers’ switching patterns.
Work Across Time. — A closer look at Figure 3 reveals that the work allocation
decisions start diverging around the halfway mark of the work stage. There is no
difference in the average number of letters encoded for the Joint Project across
treatments in the first two minutes of the Work Stage (21.6 in MB vs. 20.7 in
MA, p-value=0.76). However, in the second half of the Work Stage, workers in the
MA treatment encoded significantly more letters for the Joint Project (14.8 in MB
vs. 22.4 in MA, p-value=0.003). Over the entire work stage, this leads to higher
work for the Joint Project in MA than in MB. Though subjects work directionally
more on the Joint Project in the MA treatment on average (36.4 letters in MB
and 43.2 letters in MA), the raw difference is not significant at conventional levels
(p-value=0.12). After controlling for ability and demographics, work done on the
Joint Project is significantly different across the treatments (p-value=0.055), as
reported in the regression in Table 3 Column (2).25 Our results are robust to
considering the following as dependent variables: the fraction of total work done
on Joint Project, fraction of total time devoted to the Joint Project, and the
probability of success of the Joint Project (Appendix Table A2). Overall we find
that the act of sending a message after the Work Stage, instead of before, induces
workers to be more cooperative on average.
To gain more insight into how timing affects the distribution of work done on the
Joint Project, we split the sample around the respective medians (37 letters in MB
and 43.5 letters in MA) and estimate the treatment effect. Columns (3) and (4)
provide the results. We find that the effect of timing is only significant among the
lower quantiles.26 These regressions indicate that timing does not affect the entire
distribution, but the primary effect of the treatment is concentrated on individuals
in the lower quantiles of effort. Through additional tasks reported in Section B.B3
25Each of our controls tighten the standard errors. We see that the treatment effect is very strong for
graduate students, so including the graduate dummy significantly reduces the standard errors. If we run
the same regression dropping the graduate students, the coefficient on the treatment dummy is -6.78 and
the p-value=0.12.
26This is clearly shown in the CDF reported in Figure B2 of the Appendix.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940770 
VOL. NO. BHATTACHARYA, NIELSEN, AND SENGUPTA 23
Table 3—: Allocation of Effort
Predicting number of letters encoded for
Both Projects Joint Project
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Obs. <= Median > Median
Message Before 0.60 -8.16* -10.60*** -5.37
(0.99) (4.22) (3.20) -3.86
Part 1 Performance 1.19*** 0.40 -0.03 0.12
(0.05) (0.26) (0.17) -0.24
Constant 10.68*** 22.82 25.83** 56.45***
(3.75) (18.02) (12.55) -17.01
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 190 190 95.00 95
R-Squared 0.72 0.09 0.20 0.14
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Controls
include a dummy for gender, a dummy if the participant’s native language is English, dummies for year
in school and a dummy for graduate student. Message Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB,
0=MA) and Part 1 Performance is a subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration. The median subject
in the MB and MA treatment encoded 37 and 43.5 letters respectively for the Joint Project.
of the Appendix, we find that the lower quantiles represent individuals who are
less altruistic in general, and hence have a larger margin to deceive. Therefore,
our results suggest that the timing of communication primarily affects individuals
who are less altruistic.
These results make an important addition to the literature on pre-play com-
munication, which to-date has focused on static decision tasks.27 Our dynamic
decision context tracks cooperation over a longer time horizon, and we find that
patterns of work allocation differ conditional on timing. More importantly, we
find that individuals change their overall behavior as a response to the difference
in timing.
Result 2: Aggregate real-effort work on the Joint Project decays after com-
municating in Message Before but increases in Message After. Overall, we find
higher work on average in Message After.
C. Messages
Before turning our attention to the managers’ investment decisions, we analyze
the information managers have at the time of investment by comparing messages
sent in the MB and MA treatments. We show that messages are more inflated
27Typically subjects make a single binary choice after sending a message. In contrast, the subjects in
our setting make a choice at every point in time over an interval of four minutes.
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in MB—conditional on (perceived) ability, messages sent in the MB treatment
state higher levels of work compared to messages in the MA treatment. Figure 4
shows the frequency of messages sent by workers in MB and MA. Lower messages
are more common in the MA treatment while higher messages are more common
in the MB treatment. The modal message interval is 70-80 letters for the MB
treatment, while it is 50-60 for the MA treatment. On average, workers in the
MB treatment promise to encode 68.5 letters for the Joint Project, while workers
in the MA treatment report they had encoded 61.1 letters (p-value=0.01, K-S
p-value=0.002).28
Figure 4. : Distribution of Messages
Note: Histogram of the number of letters indicated in messages sent in the MB (shaded) and the MA
(outlined) treatments. Bin width is 10 letters. Messages where workers did not recommend investment
are excluded.
As previously discussed, messages could be exaggerated in the MB treatment
due to workers being overconfident about their ability. It is therefore important to
compare messages across treatments conditional on the information the workers
had about their performance in Part 2 at the time of sending the message. We
consider two variables. First, we compare the fraction of the total work that
workers state they will allocate (or have allocated) to the Joint Project. In the
28Appendix Table A3 confirms these results by regressing a worker’s message on the treatment dummy,
proxy for ability, forecasted performance and our standard set of controls.
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MA treatment, workers know how much they have worked, so a message m implies
allocating mwtotal to the Joint Project. In the MB treatment, a message m implies
allocating mwˆtotal , where wˆtotal is the worker’s forecast of the total number of letters
he will be able to encode in four minutes. We find that workers promise 80% of
their total work on average to the Joint Project, compared to reporting that
they have devoted 70% of the total on average when they communicate after
(p-value=0.005).29
Another clear indication that a worker intends to deceive the manager is if
his message states a number which he believes is unachievable for him in the
four minutes work time. This occurs when m > wtotal in the MA treatment or
m > wˆtotal in the MB treatment. Such unachievable messages comprise 17% of all
messages in the MB treatment and only 6% in the MA treatment (p-value=0.02).
These results indicate that workers knowingly inflate their messages more when
sending a message before working than when sending one after.
Result 3: Messages state higher levels of work on average in the Message
Before treatment compared to in the Message After treatment.
Thus, the higher misinformation in the MB treatment documented in Section
III.A is a result of both lower work and higher messages.
D. The Manager Decision
The next question that naturally arises is how managers respond to messages
and whether this varies by treatment. We focus on managers who received a mes-
sage recommending investment. Recall that a manager is matched with multiple
workers (maximum three), so most managers make three investment decisions
and can potentially receive three messages.30 We have a total of 73 subjects in
the role of manager, out of which 71 subjects received at least one message rec-
ommending investment. Non-parametric tests are based on subject averages of
the relevant variables.
We first explore whether managers expect work on the Joint Project to be dif-
ferent across the treatments. Analyzing managers’ beliefs, there is no significant
difference in the number of letters they think the worker will encode for the Joint
29In reality, workers devote 42% and 49% of their total work to the Joint Project in the MB and MA
treatments, respectively (p-value=0.15).
30To make each decision independent, the managers are paid for one randomly selected decision and
the worker’s level of work corresponding to that decision.
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Project. Overall managers expect workers to encode on average 46.3 letters in the
MB treatment and 51.1 letters in the MA treatment (p-value=0.35). Managers’
investment decisions reflect this as they are equally likely to invest across treat-
ments. On average, managers invest 55.8 percent of the time in the MB treatment
compared to 55.4 percent in the MA treatment (n1=37, n2=34, p-value=0.92).
31
To understand how informative managers expect the messages received to be,
we look at correlations between message received and the manager’s expectation
of the work on the Joint Project (EM (wJ)). On average, managers expect mes-
sages to be more informative in MA (ρ=0.57) than in MB (ρ=0.22) (p=0.004).
Though workers’ messages are more informative in MA and the managers expect
this directionally, we do not find this translating to managers in MA forming
more accurate beliefs about realized work. The correlation between realized and
expected work is 0.29 in MA and 0.25 in MB (p=0.78).
If the managers correctly discounted the messages, then on average they would
have discounted by 32.1 letters in the MB and 17.9 letters in MA, the amount
of actual message inflation. In our data, managers are too trusting, discounting
messages less than they should. Managers in MB discount messages by 22 let-
ters, thus taking into account 69% of the message inflation. In MA, managers
discount by 9.9 letters, thus taking into account only 55% of the actual message
inflation. Hence, we find that although managers correctly anticipate the higher
misinformation in MB, they misjudge its magnitude.32
This has potentially meaningful consequences for the managers. Managers’ ex-
pected payoffs are the same across treatments ($7.07 vs $7.24, p-value=0.50).
However, the empirical best-response for risk-neutral managers would guaran-
tee weakly higher payoffs for managers in MA than MB ($8.30 vs $8.60, p-
value=0.09). Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution functions of managers’
actual expected payoffs and their expected payoffs under the assumption that
work is perfectly observable. We calculate this assuming the risk-neutral best
response for managers given actual worker effort. That is, if the worker encoded
more than 23 letters, we say the manager will invest, but will not invest otherwise.
There is a significant gap between the MB and MA best response distributions,
but actual manager behavior does not capture this. Hence we find that man-
31Though managers saw up to three messages, we don’t find any effect of decision order or message
rank on investment decisions. See Appendix Table A4 for details.
32As further evidence, Figure A5 in the Appendix shows that the percentage of managers who incor-
rectly believe a message is more informative is higher in MA than MB.
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Figure 5. : CDF of Expected Payoff
Note: The best response is computed assuming risk-neutrality. Managers are assumed to invest only
when wJ ≥ 23.
agers in MA are unable to reap the potential advantages of the more informative
communication.
Result 4: Managers anticipate higher misinformation in Message Before com-
pared to Message After but underestimate the extent of the treatment difference.
IV. Possible Explanations
Overall, we find that the timing of communication affects behavior. Work-
ers are more honest and cooperative when communicating after taking actions
compared to communicating before. We designed our experiment to be a first
step in establishing the existence of a phenomenon, but our design does not al-
low for disentangling all possible explanations of the observed pattern. In this
section, we explore possible explanations for our observed treatment differences.
We provide some initial evidence for/against these explanations, but we believe
focused analysis on the underlying mechanisms will be a fruitful avenue for future
research.
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A. Beliefs of the Manager’s Perception of the Message
It is possible that, independent of the workers’ actual behavior, workers expect
managers to discount a given message more in the MB treatment than in the MA
treatment.33 Workers could respond to such beliefs in two ways. One, workers
can send a higher message in the MB treatment to compensate for this, leading
to higher observed misinformation. Two, workers send the same message in both
treatments, but work less in the MB treatment as they believe managers expect
them to do so.34 To test whether the difference in misinformation is a response
to what workers think managers expect, we first examine whether workers expect
managers to discount a given message differently across the two treatments.
Recall that we asked managers to estimate the number of letters the worker
encoded for the Joint Project, (EM (wJ)). Then we asked the worker to guess the
number the manager reported, (EW (EM (wJ))). We use the worker’s guess as a
measure of his beliefs of the amount of work the manager expects him to do. We
calculate a measure of how much the worker expects the manager will discount
his message by calculating the difference between the message sent and the work
the worker thinks the manager expects (Discount := m−EW (EM (wJ))). We find
that workers expect messages to be discounted by 17.7 letters on average in the
MB treatment compared to 10.1 letters in the MA treatment (p-value= 0.03).35
If higher misinformation in MB were driven by workers’ beliefs of the managers’
expectations, this difference should account for the higher observed misinforma-
tion in the MB treatment. Table 4 augments our regressions predicting misin-
formation in Table 2 with the variable Discount. Discount significantly increases
the amount of misinformation, although the magnitude of the effect is small. Ad-
ditionally, the coefficient of MB is still significant implying that the difference in
33A possible reason could be if managers think workers’ messages are unintentionally inflated in the
MB treatment due to overconfidence.
34This is in line with expectations-based guilt-aversion hypotheses which proposes that individuals
suffer a psychological cost proportional to the amount by which they think they fail to meet others’
expectations of them (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ederer and Stremitzer, 2016; Di Bartolomeo
et al., 2017). In our experiment, this would imply that a worker’s effort on the Joint Project will depend
on how much effort he thinks the manager expects him to put forth (the worker’s second-order belief:
EW (EM (wJ ))). A worker will encode a higher number of letters for the Joint Project when he thinks
the manager expects him to do so compared to when he thinks the manager does not expect him to do
so.
35This is confirmed by running an OLS regression predicting workers’ beliefs from the treatment
dummy, the message sent and our standard set of controls. Table A5 shows that higher messages
increase the number of letters the worker believes the manager expects him to encode for the Joint
Project. Furthermore, controlling for the message, workers in the MB treatment have significantly lower
second-order beliefs.
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Table 4—: Amount of Misinformation
Dependent variable: m− wJ
Message Before 11.24***
(3.77)










No. of Obs. 190
R-Squared 0.39
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls
include a gender dummy, a dummy for native language, and year-of-study dummies. 3 observations were
dropped since being a graduate student perfectly predicts investment. Message Before is a treatment
dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA), Part 1 Performance is a subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration,
Overestimate is a measure of forecast error, and Discount is how much the worker expects the manager
will discount his message.
expectations is not sufficient to explain the difference in misinformation between
the two treatments. Thus, it’s not the case that the difference in misinformation
across treatments is due solely to workers’ differing expectations of the managers.
B. Moral Wiggle Room
A second potential explanation of our treatment differences is that workers’
intentions are less apparent in the MB treatment and the workers may use this
moral wiggle room or veil of deniability to be more dishonest. This is perfectly
captured in one subject’s post-session questionnaire justification of why he would
prefer to be the manager in MA rather than MB :
• “I think (workers) may use the failed promise as an excuse to encode more
for themselves and just say they couldn’t do as much as they hoped”
In our game, managers are unable to infer whether a failed Joint Project in the
MB treatment was a result of intentional deception or was due to the worker over-
estimating his ability and not being able to encode as many letters as expected.
This concern is not present in MA since workers communicate after seeing their
realized effort. If workers have a preference for appearing truthful rather than
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actually being truthful, they may exploit this second-order uncertainty to delib-
erately inflate their message in the MB treatment.
We use standard one-shot matrix games to address the impact of moral wiggle
room and explore the robustness of our results to other decision contexts. The
binary nature of the task eliminates concerns about managers’ inability to infer
workers’ intentions, so moral wiggle room has no room to affect behavior in these
games. After the real-effort task, before receiving any feedback on Part 2, partic-
ipants made decisions in five 2×2 matrix games. In each game, the sender first
chooses an action, followed by the receiver. Even though the sender moves first,
his choice is unobservable to the receiver. As in the real-effort task, the sender
can signal his action to the receiver through a message. Treatments vary in when
the sender could send the message, either before or after he took his action. In the
message, the sender could signal his intended action or chosen action depending
upon the treatment, as well as recommend an action to the receiver.
Our primary interest is in the games depicted in Table 5. Note, the games in
Table 5 have the same strategic considerations as the real-effort manager-worker
game, with a reduction in the number of choices available for the worker (in this
case the sender). The sender has a dominant strategy to choose D, identical to the
worker having a dominant strategy to work on his Personal Project in the real-
effort task. The receiver faces a coordination game, where she wants to choose C
if the sender chooses C (invest if worker works on Joint Project), else choose D
(not invest). Assuming self-interested players with no costs of deception, the Nash
equilibrium outcome for the game with communication is both players choose D.
However, if individuals are other-regarding and/or suffer costs of deceiving, we
would expect outcomes to be more cooperative as seen in the real-effort task. We
look to see whether subjects misinform more in the MB treatment than in the
MA treatment, in line with results from our real-effort task.




D 70, 70 130, 30





D 70, 70 110, 30
C 30,80 90, 90
(b) Manager-Worker (Low)
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In addition, we present subjects with two versions of this game to directly test
how behavior responds to changing the benefit from misinformation. The games
in Table 5 differ only in that the temptation payoff for the sender is reduced from
130 (high stakes) to 110 (low stakes). This weakens the incentives to misinform
and, if individuals have a positive cost of deceiving, we should see less frequent
deception in the low stake games as compared to the high stake games.
At the beginning of the Choice Task, participants were randomized into roles
of sender and receiver and played in fixed roles for all five rounds. In each round,
they were presented with a different payoff matrix. In addition to the two games
in Table 5, we include three other games for robustness. Discussion of these games
can be found in Appendix Section B.B4. The order of the games was randomized
across sessions. If this part were chosen for payment, participants were paid for
their decisions in one randomly selected round.
Table 6—: Signal and Actions
High Stakes Low Stakes
Message Message Message Message
Before After p-value Before After p-value
Percent Misinforming 63.5 38.2 0.003 45.9 48.5 0.75
Percent Signaling C 91.9 75.0 0.006 82.4 80.9 0.81
Percent Choosing C 29.7 44.1 0.07 36.5 32.2 0.61
Results. — We begin by reporting the fraction of senders who misinform.36
The first row of Table 6 indicates the fraction of senders who misinform in each
game across treatments. In the high stakes game, we find strong confirmation of
our previous results—senders deceive significantly more in the MB than the MA
treatment. However, the data fail to support these hypotheses when considering
the low stake games.
These results are formalized in Table 7 which reports results from probit re-
gressions predicting whether or not a sender misinformed. In addition to the
treatment dummy (Message Before) and demographic controls, we include (i)
Round, a variable signifying the period in which the game was presented, and (ii)
36Although the sender can misinform the receiver in two possible ways - by signaling C while choosing
D or by signaling D while choosing C - the latter strategy is hard to rationalize and extremely rare,
constituting less than 1% of our observations. Our main analysis includes these observations, although
all results are robust to excluding them.
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Worker, a dummy equal to one if the the sender had been a worker in the real-
effort task. The positive coefficient on Message Before in Column (1) confirms
our conjecture that individuals are more reluctant to lie about a past action as
compared to a future action in the high stakes game. Being in the MB treat-
ment increases the probability of misinforming by 24 percentage points. Since
treatments no longer differ in how transparent the sender’s intentions are, this
difference cannot be driven by moral wiggle room.
Table 7—: Probit predicting whether sender misinforms in the Choice Task











No. of Obs. 142 142
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
Controls include a dummy for gender, a dummy if the participant’s native language is English,
dummies for year in school, and a dummy for being a graduate student. Message Before is
a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA), Worker is a dummy variable for role in Part
2 (1=worker, 0=manager), and Round is the order of the matrix game. Marginal effects reported.
In the low stake games, while we observe a positive coefficient on Message Be-
fore, this is not statistically significant. There are several possible explanations for
this. It is possible that the timing is relevant only for a subset of participants—
those who have substantial costs of misinforming. Since the benefit from mis-
informing shrinks in the low-stake game (the difference between the temptation
payoff and cooperation payoff is only $2), one would expect only senders with
very low costs of deception to misinform. Alternatively, note that the sender’s
decision and signal are binary variables. Unlike the real-effort task, where we
captured the size of the misinformation, the choice task only allows us to capture
whether or not the sender misinformed. This could possibly make it harder to
identify a small treatment effect.
Analogous to the real-effort task, we can decompose the misinformation in the
Choice Task into its two components—signal and action. Due to the binary
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nature of our decision variables, we compare the frequency of cooperative signals
and actions across treatments. Table 6 displays the overall fraction of senders who
signal the cooperative action C and the fraction of senders who choose C. Recall
that, in the real-effort task, messages sent before the action was taken promised
a higher level of cooperation. Row 2 of Table 6 indicates that same pattern. A
vast majority of senders choose to signal C in both treatments. The percent of
C signals is always higher in the MB treatment, and significantly more so in the
High stakes game. Not only do workers send higher messages in MB, but they
cooperate less often. Row 3 shows that individuals are significantly more likely
to choose C in MA than in MB in the High stakes game.
Overall, we find that individuals misinform more in MB than MA when the po-
tential gains from misinformation are high, even when we remove potential moral
wiggle room. This suggests that moral wiggle room is not the only mechanism
driving our main result.
C. Differential Cost of Deception
We asked subjects directly whether and why they think that timing of com-
munication would impact behavior. In a post-session questionnaire all subjects
(managers and workers) were presented with the following question before seeing
the results:
Imagine you are (the manager) and you can now determine when you
want (the worker) to send you the message. Choose which scenario
you would pick.
Scenario 1: (The worker) sends a message before he begins working.
Scenario 2: (The worker) sends a message after he finishes working.
In both scenarios, you do not learn how many letters (the worker)
encoded or whether or not the project was successful. You only see his
message before deciding to invest.
Table 8 presents their responses. A large percentage of subjects state a strict
preference for the worker sending a message only after he has worked. We also
asked subjects to give reasons supporting their choice of response. Though
the reasons varied, they could be categorized into three broad justifications—
accuracy, differential cost of deception, and moral wiggle room.
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Table 8—: Preferred Treatment
Responses MB MA p-value
Prefer MB 10.8 21.0 0.02
Prefer MA 51.3 44.8 0.27
Indifferent 34.6 37.8 0.57
Notes: Percent of workers in each treatment who stated preferring MB,
MA or being indifferent to the two treatments.
The most commonly cited argument (≈ 60%) for preferring Scenario 2 was
that the worker could have a better estimate of his performance when sending
a message after working. Some subjects qualified this argument by stating this
preference was based on the assumption that workers would be honest. However,
given our analysis we already know this uncertain ability is not the reason driving
the difference in behavior. Some representative responses are given below.
• “At least there’s a better chance of the number being more accurate than a
projection before Player A starts.”
• “Would prefer to know what was actually done, assuming they are being
honest.”
The remaining justification, and the explanation we find most compelling, is
that the moral cost of deception in MA is higher than that in MB. A number of
participants’ responses hinted at it being psychologically more difficult to deceive
later (≈ 27%), with a few illustrative responses below.
• “I think it’s harder to lie about something you *just* did.”
• “It would be harder to lie, knowing what the results were.”
• “...After they’ve already completed it, there is no uncertainty, and lying
about the number would weigh more heavily on their conscience.”
These responses point towards the idea that a realized level of work is morally
difficult to misrepresent outright. It may be that subjects find it harder to at-
tribute their dishonesty to external factors when the work has been realized.37
37We also asked participants who they would punish more: a person who broke his promise or a liar.
71% of participants stated wanting to punish a liar more than someone who broke his promise.
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V. Discussion
Over the past decade, an extensive literature has documented that non-binding
statements of intent or promises can be informative and can increase cooperation
in social dilemmas. But not all instances of communication are forward-looking.
We design a two-player hidden action game to compare ex-ante and ex-post com-
munication. We find that a communication regime where individuals report on
past decisions results in more truthful communication and in higher overall effort
than one in which individuals communicate about their intended future effort.
Our results show that timing of communication is a critical variable that merits
attention in the design of mechanisms. In addition, our results raise questions
about the appropriateness of conflating promise-breaking and lying about a past
action. Over the years, legal thinkers and philosophers have discussed whether
misrepresenting intent is the same as misrepresenting a fact (Cavico, 1997; Ayres
and Klass, 2008). We provide empirical investigation into this question and show
that they are, in fact, different.
We hypothesize that the observed difference in our data has two behavioral
foundations. First, the moral cost of lying about a past action is higher than the
cost of breaking a promise. Qualitative responses from subjects, as well as our
own introspection, suggest that lies about past actions weigh more heavily on our
consciences than do broken promises. Previous papers have shown that higher
mutability of an outcome is associated with more misreporting (Batson et al.,
1997, Shalvi et al., 2011, Shalvi, Eldar and Bereby-Meyer, 2012, Shalvi et al.,
2015). We don’t directly manipulate mutability, which was the focus of their
papers, but “moral wiggle room” under ex-ante communication could be thought
to play a similar role. The future is inherently more mutable than the past, which
could contribute to higher misinformation in statements about future actions. We
think it would be interesting for future research to look into disentangling the pure
timing aspect from other related notions of mutability and uncertainty.
Second, our results on the patterns of work over time suggest that commu-
nication may trigger moral responses that operate, at least partially, through
salience which is asymmetric for past and future actions. Such temporal asym-
metry has previously been demonstrated in Caruso, Gilbert and Wilson (2008)
in a non-strategic decision context. Caruso, Gilbert and Wilson (2008) find that
individuals value future events more than past events. Whether this “temporal
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value asymmetry” is similarly driving results in our environment leaves an inter-
esting question for future research. In addition, we know relatively little about
the impact of communication in environments with long time horizons. Our pa-
per takes a first step in addressing this, but our understanding of communication
would benefit greatly from more focused study in this area.
Finally, our results bring to light the need for more concentrated research on
the salience effect of norms and moral decision making. Shu et al. (2012) find
that signing tax forms on top versus on the bottom increases the frequency of
truthful reporting. They suggest that signing on top primes individuals to have
morality at the top of mind, so they are more likely to follow the honest social
norm. In their environment, however, individuals are deciding how truthfully
to report on an exogenous outcome.38 We show that when a person is able to
jointly optimize message and action, the patterns of lying may be reversed. Our
environment differs from theirs in many other regards. In particular, subjects
were primed with a moral stance to report truthfully in their experiment. In
contrast, we made no mention of morality and subjects were free to choose their
own honesty levels. Most daily interactions are free from moral priming, so if
this aspect of the environment is contributing to the differences in our results,
the direction of misreporting in our paper is what we should expect to observe
more frequently. Experiments looking into the aspects of these environments
that contribute to these differences in behavior would be very interesting. This
strikes us as particularly important for policy makers and institutional designers
who may wish to use this information to nudge behavior toward truth-telling and
cooperation.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A1. : Work Stage Screen
Figure A2. : Ability Distribution in the Effort Task
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Figure A3. : Distribution of Misinformation
Table A1—: Estimated and Actual Mean number of letters encoded in Part 2
Message Before Message After p-value
Estimate (wˆtotal) 85.39 85.44 0.98
(12.3) (12.5)
Actual (wtotal) 87.6 86.8 0.65
(12.9) (11.5)
Overestimate -2.25 -1.4 0.51
(wˆtotal − wtotal) (9.4) (7.8)
Note: Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. p-values are calculated using Fisher-Pitman
permutation test using Monte Carlo method with 200,000 simulations.
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Table A2—: Effort Allocation in the Joint Project
Dependent Variable:
Fraction of total work Fraction of total time spent Probability of Success





) (p = wJ
wJ+23
× 100)
Message Before -0.08* -0.08* -7.44*
(0.05) (0.05) (4.04)
Part 1 Performance -0.00 -0.00 0.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.26)
Constant 0.65*** 0.67*** 44.38**
(0.21) (0.20) (17.63)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 190 190 190
R-Squared 0.07 0.08 0.08
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Controls
include dummy if the participant’s native language is English, dummies for year in school and a dummy
for graduate student. Message Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA) and Part 1
Performance is the subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration.
Table A3—: Messages
Dependent variable: Content of Message
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Message Before 7.38** 6.45** 7.39** 9.78***
(3.29) (3.26) (3.29) (3.04)




Overestimate*Message Before 0.84 1.15**
(0.60) (0.56)
Number of Letters 0.27***
Encoded for Joint Project (0.05)
Constant 61.16*** 24.01* 19.53 12.13
(2.41) (13.24) (13.22) (11.68)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 190 190 190 190
R-Squared 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.26
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard
errors. Controls include a dummy for gender, a dummy for native language,
year-of-study dummies and a dummy for being a graduate student. Message
Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA), Part 1 Performance is the
subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration, and Overestimate is a measure
of forecast error.
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Figure A4. : Distribution of Work Over Time for Workers Who Could Achieve
Stated Message
Figure A5. : Fraction of manager decisions where the manager underestimates
the actual level of message inflation
Note: The data include all observation where the message was inflated. The x-axis depicts The y-axis
depicts the percentage of manager decisions where the managers underestimates the extent to which the
message received is inflated i.e. m− EM (wJ ) < m− wJ .
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Table A4—: Effect of decision order and message rank on investment
Dependent variable: Investment
(1) (2) (3)
Message Before -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Mesage 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Message2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)






Clusters 70 70 70
No. of Obs. 187 187 187
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the subject
level. Controls include a dummy for gender, a dummy for native language, and
year-of-studies dummies. Message Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB,
0=MA), Message is the message received by the manager, Message2 squares
this message due to the concave probability function, Part 1 Performance is
the subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration, Decision Order is the order
in which the manager saw the message (from top of screen to bottom), and
Message Rank is the relative ranking of the message content among all messages
the manager received. 3 observations are dropped as being a graduate student
perfectly predicts investment.
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Part 1 Performance -0.03
(0.22)
Controls Yes
No. of Obs. 190
R-Squared 0.42
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in
parenthesis are robust standard errors. Controls
include a gender dummy, a dummy for native
language, year-of-study dummies and a dummy
for being a graduate student. Message Before
is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA,
Message is the message sent by the worker, and
Part 1 Performance is the subject’s performance
in the Part 1 calibration.
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Appendix B: Additional Results
B1. Conservative Messages
Though the frequency of inflated messages is higher in the MB treatment as
compared to the MA treatment, there is a positive fraction of workers (16 subjects)
whose messages are conservative in the MB treatment. This can be seen from
the negative starting point of the CDF of misinformation in the MB treatment.
Since it is not strategically beneficial to the worker to under-promise, one potential
explanation can be that these workers mistakenly exceed the number promised.
This is possible if subjects fail to notice the number of current encoded letters on
their screens and forget to make the switch to working on the Personal Project.
In fact, 11 out of these 16 workers with conservative messages started off working
for the Joint Project and subsequently switched to the Personal Project. 25%
switched after exceeding the promised amount by 1 letter, 50% by 5 letters, and
100% within 8 letters, suggesting that conservative messages may be driven partly
by inattention. 4 workers started working on the Joint Project but never switched.
Most likely, these are workers who underestimated how much they could encode
in total; they wanted to work only on the Joint Project, so they simply keep
working even after realizing they can encode more than promised. It is important
to note that since misinformation is higher in the MB treatment, such conservative
messages only bring down the average message inflation in the MB treatment. We
find that if we treat conservative messages as fully informative (i.e. counted as
zero rather than negative misinformation), average misinformation is 85% higher
in MB than in MA (p <0.001, n=190).
B2. Switching Patterns
Overall across both treatments, the most frequent strategy is to switch once
(42% in MB and 39% in MA). However, switching patterns are most informative
when we condition on the project the worker begins with since a single switch
from Joint to Personal reflects moving towards cooperation while a switch from
Personal to Joint reflects moving away from cooperation.
Figure B1 depicts the three most frequent switching patterns conditional on
initial choice of project.39 When workers start with the Joint Project (Figure
39Only 12% of workers switch more than twice.
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(a) Start with Joint Project (b) Start with Personal Project
Note: J: worked on Joint Project for all four minutes. P: worked on Personal Project for all four minutes.
J-P: started with the Joint Project and switched over to the Personal Project. P-J: started with the
Personal Project and switched over to the Joint Project. J-P-J: started with the Joint Project, switched
over to the Personal Project, and switched back to the Joint Project. P-J-P: started with the Personal
Project, switched over to the Joint Project, and switched back to the Personal Project.
Figure B1. : Switching Patterns
B1a), a higher frequency of workers switch once to the Personal Project in MB
than in MA (56% vs 28%, p-value=0.006), as shown in the middle two bars. On
the other hand, when workers start with the Personal Project (Figure B1b), a
lower frequency of workers switch to the Joint Project in MB than in MA (25%
vs 48%, p-value=0.02). Hence, we find a general tendency of workers moving
away from the Joint Project at higher rates in MB than in MA. We find similar
patterns when we look at zero (bars 1 and 2) and two (bars 3 and 4) switches.
These results suggest that the divergence in cooperative behavior observed over
time is not driven by a few select workers but is more widespread.
B3. Evidence for Timing of Communication Affecting Work Decisions for Less
Altruistic Individuals
To expand the analysis on work decision, Figure B2 shows the cumulative num-
ber of letters encoded for the Joint Project. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows no
difference between the two distributions (p-value=0.15). However, the Message
After treatment stochastically dominates the Message Before treatment, with the
largest differences occurring for low levels of work. As we observed in Table 3
in the main text, the difference in aggregate work stems from the work being
different in the lower quartiles.
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Figure B2. : Distribution of Work in Joint Project
Why does timing affect only the lower quantiles of the distribution of work
done for the Joint Project? Since the lower quantiles represent workers who are
encoding fewer letters for the Joint Project, its natural to conjecture that they
are individuals who are less altruistic.40 To be clear, by altruism we refer to a
baseline preference for cooperation or other-regarding behavior, in the absence
of communication.41 For a subset of the sample we have a coarse measure of
altruism. We will use this measure (described below) to see if altruism measures
correlate with work done on the Joint Project.
In Sessions 10-16, at the end of the experiment we collected data on a series
of binary decisions where subjects chose between two options - Option A, which
gives both him and another random player 90 points each, and Option B, which
pays the subject some positive payoff x and the other player 30 points. Subjects
made 13 decisions, presented to them in a list (Figure B3) which varied the value
of x from 90 to 150 points in intervals of 5 points. We use the subject’s switch
point (the row he starts preferring Option B to Option A) as a measure for his
altruistic preferences. Switching in later rows indicate a higher level of altruism.
In the sub-sample of workers for whom we have data on this measure, we find
40Alternatively, since working on the Joint Project is also risky for the worker, as he is unsure of the
manager’s investment, these may be individuals who are risk-averse.
41This is not to be confused with a cooperative outcome, which may be the result of altruistic prefer-
ences or (and) positive costs of deception.
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Figure B3. : Dictator Decisions
that workers encoding less than the median number of letters switch from prefer-
ring Option A to preferring Option B significantly earlier than workers encoding
more than the median, indicating more selfish preferences (p-value=0.05). Table
B1 shows that including a variable denoting the switch point has a positive and
significant effect on the number of letters encoded for the Joint Project, con-
firming our conjecture that lower work done for the Joint Project correlates with
lower baseline altruism. If it is the case that the distribution of work for the
Joint Project simply reflects the distribution of subjects’ altruistic preferences, it
could well be that the difference in work observed between treatments is due to
differences in the levels of altruism. Though our random assignment of subjects
should eliminate systematic differences across treatments, we compare the aver-
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Table B1—: Decision to Work
Dependent variable: Number of letters encoded for Joint Projet
Full Sample Sub-sample Sub-sample
(All sessions) (Sessions 10-16) (Sessions 10-16)
Message Before -8.38** -14.14** -12.35**
(4.20) (6.17) (6.02)




Constant 24.51 54.13* 42.45
(18.39) (29.67) (30.37)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 190 88 88
R-Squared 0.10 0.14 0.18
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Controls include dummy if the
participant’s native language is English, dummies for year in school and a dummy for
graduate student. Message Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA),
Part 1 Performance is the subject’s performance in the Part 1 calibration, and Baseline
Altruism is measured from the subject’s dictator game decision.
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
age switch points in each treatment. We find no difference in subject’s altruism
between them (p-value=0.28). Hence, our results suggest that timing of commu-
nication predominantly affects behavior for individuals who are less altruistic.
One possible explanation of our results is that less altruistic individuals have
a larger margin to deceive in persuading the manager to invest as compared to
individuals who are more altruistic, and if the timing of communication affects
costs of misinforming differently, one should expect it to affect the lower-tail
more than the upper tail. Indeed in our data, subjects below the median work
less in the MB treatment, but their messages are significantly higher (65.9 letters
versus 50.9 letters, p-value=0.002). But for the above median workers, there is
no difference in the messages sent (71.4 vs 71.1, p-value=0.95).
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B4. Matrix Games
Building on the results from Section IV.B, we report results from all five matrix
games used. The games are depicted in Table B2. The Manager-Worker game was
discussed in the text, and we include it here for comparison with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Stag Hunt games. In both Manager-Worker and Prisoner’s Dilemma
games, we also included a version of the game where the temptation payoff was
reduced from 130 to 110.




D 70, 70 130, 30





D 70, 70 130, 30





D 70, 70 80, 30
C 30,80 90, 90
(c) Stag Hunt
A motivation in using these other games is in knowing whether our results
generalize to other environments involving strategic information transmission.
We use a Prisoner’s Dilemma and a Stag Hunt game for two reasons. First, in
both the games, conditional on wanting to choose D, senders have an incentive
to assure the receiver that he has chosen (will choose) C.42 This is crucial to our
environment as we want senders to have a monetary incentive to deceive their
counterparts.
Second, in both games the efficient outcome occurs when both players choose C,
similar to the manager-worker game. However, the games differ in the reason why
42In both games, regardless of his action, the sender prefers the receiver choose C. In the stag hunt
game, the receiver does better by choosing C only if the sender has also chosen C. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, if receivers are other-regarding, they may choose C to an expectation of the sender choosing C.
Hence, in both games, if the sender wants the receiver to choose C, he has to persuade the receiver that
he has chosen C with sufficiently high probability. Additionally, D is the sender’s dominant strategy in
the prisoner’s dilemma while in the stag hunt D is the sender’s risk-dominant strategy. This creates an
incentive for the sender to choose D in both games.
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players may fail to achieve it. This allows us to investigate whether our results
extend to situations strategically different from the manager-worker game. In the
prisoner’s dilemma, the sender has a dominant strategy to choose D identical to
the manager-worker game. In contrast, the receiver no longer has an incentive to
coordinate as she now also has a dominant strategy of choosing D. In the stag
hunt game, both players want to coordinate their actions on the payoff dominant
outcome (C,C ), but (D,D) is the risk-dominant outcome. Furthermore, note
that the only difference between the games is in the payoff a player receives if he
chooses D and the other player chooses C (temptation payoff).43 Starting from
the manager-worker game, we increase the receiver’s temptation payoff to get the
prisoner’s dilemma, and decrease the sender’s temptation to get the stag hunt.
Third, we use the Stag Hunt game to compare with existing theoretical predic-
tions. Zultan (2013) and Schlag and Vida (2015) propose solution concepts that
predict truthful communication equilibria in the MB but not MA treatment. We
look to see how this interacts with other forces driving differences between MB
and MA.
B5. Results
Figure B4 indicates the fraction of senders who misinform in each of the five
games across treatments. A considerable fraction of senders send false signals in
the manager-worker and prisoner’s dilemma games. In contrast, only a few do so
in the stag hunt. This is expected as both players do better by coordinating their
actions in the stag hunt. In the high stakes games, we find strong confirmation of
our previous results; senders deceive significantly more in the MB than the MA
treatment. However, the data fail to support these hypotheses when considering
the low stake games. These results are formalized in a regression in Table B3.
In the stag-hunt game, we find no effect of timing on sender behavior. This
observation is in contrast to the experimental findings of Charness (2000). Over
ten rounds of a repeated stag hunt game, Charness (2000) finds senders who
send a message before taking an action deceive only 5.8% of times as compared
to 35% when senders send a message after taking an action. We find 18% and
43In the stag hunt, both players’ temptation payoff is lower than the payoff from mutual cooperation.
In the manager-worker, the receiver’s temptation payoff is lower while the sender’s is higher compared
to mutual cooperation. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both players’ temptation payoff is higher than the
payoff from mutual cooperation.
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Figure B4. : Misinformation in the Matrix Games
Note: Percent of Senders who deceive i.e. senders who signal the cooperative action C but choose the
selfish action D. MW: Manager Worker; PD: Prisoner’s Dilemma; High and Low refers to the value of
the temptation payoff. High Stake: temptation payoff 130; Low Stake: temptation payoff 110.
16% of senders deceive in the MB and MA treatment respectively. One possible
explanation could be that Charness (2000) employs a ten-round repeated game
with feedback between rounds, while in our design subjects play the stag hunt
only once. As the author mentions, cooperative play decreases significantly over
time in the MA treatment, and comparing our results to the round one decisions
in Charness (2000) would be a more apt comparison. Additionally, our results
from the MB treatment can be compared to Clark, Kay and Sefton (2001), who
find similar results from a stag hunt game with pre-play communication (albeit
two-way communication). Our observations are comparable to their results.
These results show the difference between ex-ante and ex-post communication
may extend to more general domains. Our results are robust to restricting the
sample to exclude those who send no message, as well as when we compare the
fraction of senders who send truthful messages.
Decomposing Misinformation in Matrix Games. — Analogous to the real-effort
task, we can decompose the misinformation in the Choice Task into its two com-
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Table B3—: Probit predicting whether sender misinforms in the Choice Task
Dependent variable: Probability Sender Misinforms
Manager-Worker Prisoner’s Dilemma Stag Hunt
High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Message Before 0.24*** 0.04 0.16** 0.13 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Round 0.02 0.05** 0.06** 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Worker -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08)
No. of Obs. 142 142 142 142 142
Note: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors
clustered at subject-level. Controls include participant’s age, gender dummy and race dummies.
Message Before is a treatment dummy variable (1=MB, 0=MA), Worker is a Part 2 role
dummy variable (1=worker, 0=manager), and Round is the order in which the game appeared.
Marginal effects reported.
ponents - signal and action. Due to the binary nature of our decision variables,
we compare the frequency of cooperative signals and actions across treatments.
Table B4 displays the overall fraction of senders who signal the cooperative ac-
tion C and the fraction of senders who choose C. Recall, in the real-effort task,
messages sent before the action is taken promised a higher level of cooperation.
Table B4 Columns 3-5 indicates that same pattern. A vast majority of senders
choose to signal C in both treatments. Additionally the percent of C signals is
always higher in the MB treatment for all games. However, Table B4 shows these
differences are significant only for the high-stake manager-worker and stag-hunt
games. The p-value for the high-stake prisoner’s dilemma is borderline significant
at 0.11.44 Turning to the fraction of times senders actually took the cooperative
action C, Columns 6-8 indicate that, except for the stag hunt and manager-worker
low stake, senders are more likely to choose the cooperative action. Moreover,
the magnitudes on the coefficients are very small. Instead, senders are more co-
operative in the MB treatment in the stag hunt game. This latter result provides
evidence for Farrell’s argument and is consistent with Charness [2000] results. It
44The p-values for prisoner’s dilemma high and low stake are 0.11 and 0.19 respectively. Since, our
primary design was the real-effort task, our power calculation was based on it, we are probably under-
powered to conclusively identify a treatment effect with binary variables. If we pool the data for the
two stakes in the prisoner’s dilemma, the treatment effect is significant at 10%, which provides some
supporting evidence for the sample being underpowered.
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also proves that participants are responding to incentives and the structure of the
strategic interaction.
Table B4—: Signal and Actions
Percentage of Senders Percentage of Senders
sending Signal C choosing Action C
Message Message Message Message
Before After p-value Before After p-value
Manager-Worker
High 91.9 75.0 0.006 29.7 44.1 0.07
Low 82.4 80.9 0.81 36.5 32.3 0.61
Prisoner’s Dilemma
High 79.7 73.5 0.38 24.3 30.9 0.38
Low 82.4 72.1 0.14 29.7 32.4 0.74
Stag Hunt 89.2 76.5 0.04 75.7 60.3 0.05
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Appendix C: Instructions
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Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating in this study. This is a study of individual behavior and decision 
making. At this time, please turn off and put away any electronic devices/phones you may have 
brought with you. There may be moments where you will have to sit and wait while others in 
the room make their decisions, and we ask you to be patient.  
This experiment has 3 parts. In each part you have the opportunity to earn points. The points 
will be converted to dollars for your final payment. The conversion rate is $1 = 10 points. In 
addition, you can earn points in a bonus stage. One part will be randomly chosen to determine 
your payment at the end of the session.  
Part 1 
In Part 1, everyone will have a chance to earn money by working on a task. The task is the same 
for everyone. We will call it the Encoding Task. The task consists of converting letters into 
numbers. Your screen displays a table with two rows. The first row contains all of the letters in 
the alphabet and the second row provides a number that goes with that letter. During the task, 
you will be given a letter and you must enter the corresponding number in the box on your 
screen. You must validate your aŶswer bǇ pressiŶg the ͚Subŵit͛ buttoŶ. The computer only 
accepts correct entries, so if you answer incorrectly, a prompt will ask you to correct it. Once 
you submit the correct entry for that letter, the table will reset and you will be presented with 
another letter to encode and so on. You will have three minutes to convert as many letters as 
you can. A counter on the screen will keep track of the number of letters you encode. 
 At the end of the 3 minutes, you will be informed of the number of letters you have 
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 Earnings for Part 1:  
 
If Part 1 is chosen for payment, you will be paid based on how many letters you encode. There 
is a total amount of 100 points. The total number of letters you encode determines the share of 
these 100 points you will receive, in the following way: 
 
Imagine there is a bag with 23 blue balls in it. For every letter you encode, we put a red ball into 
the bag. This means, if you encode a total of ͚ǆ͛ number of letters in the 3 minutes, the bag will 
contain 23 blue balls + ͚x͛ red balls at the end of the 3 minutes.  
The share of the 100 points you earn will be the percentage of red balls in the bag, given by: 
 
       =
𝒙𝐱+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙ 
 
 
If you encode 0 letters, you receive 
૙૙+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙=0 points 
 
If you encode 1 letter, you receive 
૚૚+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙= ૚૙૙૛૝  = 4.17 points 
 
If you encode 2 letters, you receive 
૛૛+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙ =  ૛૙૙૛૞  = 8 points 
 




Notice that the more letters you encode, you always earn more as the share of red balls in the 
bag increases. However, every additional letter you encode gives you a lower share per letter 
than the previous. 
 
The exact payment schedule is listed in the table below: (Please take a moment to go over this, 
and ask us any questions you may have now).  
 
Before we start, you will be given a chance to practice this task for a minute to familiarize 
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Part 2 
 
In this part, you will be randomly assigned either the role of A or the role of B. The decisions 




Each Player A will interact with another randomly chosen Player B in this room. The amount of 
points you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. Your interaction is completely 
anonymous, so participants will only be referred to as A and B for the duration of the 
experiment.  
 
Here is what you will have to do: 
 
Player B Decision and Payoff: 
 
Player B decides whether to invest or not iŶ a pƌojeĐt Đalled ͞JoiŶt PƌojeĐt͟. IŶǀestiŶg is 
profitable only if the JoiŶt PƌojeĐt is ͞suĐĐessful͟.  
 If B invests, and the Joint Project is successful, she receives 130 points.  
 If B invests, and the Joint Project is unsuccessful, she receives 10 points.  




The success of the Joint Project, hoǁeǀer is not under Player B’s control. It depends on Player A 
and how much Player A works for the Joint Project. The more Player A works for the Joint 
Project, the higher the chance of it being successful (more on this below). 
Player A Decision and Payoff:  
 
Player A has two projects he can work on – the ͞JoiŶt PƌojeĐt͟ aŶd the ͞PeƌsoŶal PƌojeĐt͟. He 
has 4 minutes to work and he can split his time anyway he likes between the two Projects. Both 
Projects entail working on a series of encoding tasks as before. The number of letters encoded 
foƌ eaĐh pƌojeĐt is the ŵeasuƌe of ǁoƌk doŶe foƌ that pƌojeĐt. PlaǇeƌ A͛s eaƌŶiŶgs is a suŵ of his 
earnings from each project. 
 
 Joint Project Earnings: PlaǇeƌ A͛s eaƌŶiŶgs fƌoŵ the JoiŶt PƌojeĐt depeŶds only on Player 
B͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶ. 
o If Player B invests in the Joint Project, Player A earns 120 points from the Joint 
Project. 
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o If Player B does not invest in the Joint Project, Player A receives 0 points from 
the Joint Project. 
o These earnings do NOT depend on whether the Joint Project is successful. 
 
 Personal Project Earnings: Player A͛s earnings from the Personal Project depends on 
how much he works (number of letters encoded) for the Personal Project. The payment 
for the Personal Project is exactly the same payment schedule as in Part 1. 
o There is a total of 100 points. The total number of letters Player A encodes for 
the Personal Project determines the share of these 100 points he receives. 
Theƌe is a ďag laďeled ͞PeƌsoŶal Bag͟ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs Ϯϯ ďlue ďalls. Foƌ eǀeƌǇ 
letter Player A encodes for the Personal Project, we add a red ball to the 
Personal Bag. After the 4 minutes are over, Player A receives a share from these 
100 points. The percentage of red balls in the Personal Bag determines the share 
he receives.  
 




When is the Joint Project Successful? 
 
The amount of work done by Player A for the Joint Project (number of letters encoded for the 
Joint Project) determines the success of the Joint Project in the following way:  
 
Theƌe is aŶotheƌ ďag laďeled ͚JoiŶt Bag͛ ǁhiĐh also contains 23 blue balls. For every letter Player 
A encodes for the Joint Project, ǁe put a ƌed ďall iŶ the ͚JoiŶt Bag͛.  Afteƌ the end of the 4 
minutes work time, we randomly pick a ball from this bag. If the ball drawn is red, the Joint 
Project is successful. If it is blue, the Joint Project fails.  
This means that the chance of Joint Project being successful increases with the number of 
letters encoded by Player A for the Joint Project, as it increases the number of red balls in the 
͚JoiŶt Bag͛ and makes it more likely that a red ball is selected. Conversely, the less Player A 
encodes the higher the chance that the Joint Project fails. 
 
To ƌepƌeseŶt this ŵatheŵatiĐallǇ, if PlaǇeƌ A eŶĐodes ͚j͛ Ŷuŵďeƌ of letteƌs foƌ the JoiŶt PƌojeĐt, 
the exact chance of success for the Joint Project is given by: 
=
𝒋𝒋+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙ 
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A sheet is provided to you that list the chance of success of the Joint Project for each possible 
number of letters encoded by Player A for the Joint Project. It also lists the earnings Player A 
would receive for the corresponding number of letters encoded in the Personal Project (if you 




Player A will have 4 minutes to work on his Projects. Then, after the work-stage is over, Player B 
will make her investment decision.Note that Player B does NOT learn whether the Project is 
successful until AFTER she makes the investment decision. Player B NEVER finds out how many 
letters were encoded by Player A for the Joint Project; she only comes to know if it was 




After the work stage (but before Player B makes her investment decision), Player A has an 
option to send a message to Player B. In this message, Player A can state how many letters he 
has encoded for the Joint Project. Player B receives this message, after which Player B makes 
her investment choice. The message is the only information Player B receives before she makes 
her investment decision. 
 
The sequence of the decisions is as follows: 
 
1. Roles determined randomly in a pair. Participants informed of their roles and the ID of 
their co-participant.  
 
2. Work Stage: Player A will have 4 minutes to work. For every letter encoded in the work-
stage, Player A can decide which Project he would want the work to go towards. Player 
A will select which Project he wants to start with. At any point during the work-stage A 
will be allowed to switch back and forth as often he likes between the two Projects. 
There is no limit on the amount of times he is allowed to switch between these two 
Projects. Two counters displayed on the screen will keep track of the number of letters 
encoded for each Project.  Between these, there are buttons that will allow Player A to 
switch between working for the two projects. If you are unsure about which Project 




1. Message Stage: Player A will be given the opportunity to send a message to Player B, 
where A can fill in a statement regarding how many letters he has encoded for the Joint 
Project as well as a suggestioŶ to PlaǇeƌ B oŶ heƌ aĐtioŶ. The stateŵeŶt ƌeads ͞Hi, I haǀe 
encoded           letteƌs foƌ the JoiŶt PƌojeĐt. You should/should Ŷot iŶǀest.͟ PlaǇeƌ A ĐaŶ 
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fill in any non-negative number in the blank. If Player A chooses not to send any 
message, PlaǇeƌ B ǁill ƌeĐeiǀe the ŵessage ͞A has ĐhoseŶ Ŷot to seŶd aŶǇ ŵessage͟. 
The message from A will be communicated to B as soon as he sends it. 
 
 
2. Investment Stage: After Player B receives a message (if Player A sends one), Player B 
makes her investment choice. B will be able to see the message A sent her when she 






We will provide the following information about your co-paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s deĐisioŶ aŶd the 
outcome at the end of the session. 
 
 Player A will be informed whether Player B invested or not and if the Joint Project was 
successful. 
 If Player B invested in the Joint Project, she will only be informed whether the Project 
was a success or a failure. Player B will not be informed of the number of letters encoded 
by Player A for the Joint Project. If Player B does not invest in the Joint Project, she 
receives no information about the outcome of the Joint Project. 
 
The last page is a summary broken down by role. There are a few questions about the 
procedure after that to test your understanding of the instructions. Please review that and raise 
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To recap, broken down by roles: 
 
Player A 
o Decides to split 4 minutes worth of work between Personal Project and Joint 
Project. 
o CaŶ ͞seŶd a ŵessage͟ to PlaǇeƌ B after the Work Stage about how much he has 
worked  for the Joint Project. 
 
o Receives  
𝒙𝐱+૛૜ ∗ ૚૙૙ poiŶts foƌ ͚ǆ͛ letters encoded for the Personal Project. 
 
o Receives 120 points from the Joint Project, only if Player B invests in the Joint 




o Decides whether or not to invest in the Joint Project. 
o ͞Receives a message͟ from Player A before she makes her investment decision, 
but never learns the number of letters encoded for the Joint Project 
o If she invests and Joint Project is  
o successful receives 130 points 
o failure receives 10 points 
o If she does not invest receives 70 points. 
 
1. Assume that you are Player B and you invest in the Joint Project. If the Joint Project is 
successful, you will receive _________ points, and if the Joint Project fails, you will receive 
________ points. 
2. Assume that you are Player B and you do not invest in the Joint Project. If the Joint Project is 
successful, you will receive _________  points, and if the Joint Project fails, you will receive 
________ points. 
 
3. The success of the Joint Project depends on which of the following? 
a. The number of letters Player A encodes for the Personal Project. 
b. The number of letters Player A encodes for the Joint Project. 
c. PlaǇeƌ B͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶ. 
 
4. If you are Player B, you 
a. NEVER get to see how many letters Player A encoded for the Joint Project. (TRUE/FALSE)  
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b. will get to see the success/failure of the Joint Project BEFORE you decide whether or not 
to invest in the Joint Project. ____________ (TRUE/FALSE) 
5. will get to see the message from Player A (if Player A chooses to send a message), 
BEFORE you decide whether or not to invest in the Joint Project. _________ 
(TRUE/FALSE) 
 
6. Does PlaǇeƌ A͛s paǇoff fƌoŵ the JoiŶt PƌojeĐt depeŶd upoŶ  
 
a. The success of the Joint Project? (YES/NO)  
b. PlaǇeƌ B͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶ? ;YES/NOͿ 
c. How many letters Player A encodes for the Joint Project? (YES/NO) 
 
7. Does PlaǇeƌ A͛s paǇoff fƌoŵ the PeƌsoŶal PƌojeĐt depeŶd upoŶ  
 
a. The success of the Joint Project? (YES/NO)  
b. PlaǇeƌ B͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶ? ;YES/NOͿ 
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Part 3 
This is the final part of the experiment. In this part, you will be asked to make decisions in 5 
different rounds.  
Roles: 
 At the beginning of Round 1, half of the people in this room will be assigned the role of 
Player 1 and the other half will be assigned the role of Player 2. Your role will remain 
constant over all 5 rounds. 
 In each round, a Player 1 will be matched with a Player 2, and the two of you will form a 
pair. You will be matched with a DIFFERENT person in the room in each round, so you 
will never interact with the same person more than once. 
 In each round, Player 1 will make his choice first, and Player 2 will make her choice 
second.  
 Player 2 will NOT learn Player 1͛s deĐisioŶ ďefore she makes her own choice. 
Decisions and Payoffs: 
In each round, you will decide whether you want to choose action ͚X͛ or ͚Y.͛ Your payoffs ǁill 
depend on what you choose and on what the other person in your pair chooses. The possible 




 X Y 
X 70,70 80,30 
Y 30,80 90,90 
 
IŶ eaĐh Đell, Player ϭ͛s payoff is listed first aŶd Player Ϯ͛s payoff is listed seĐoŶd. The actual 
payoffs that are realized will be deterŵiŶed ďy Player ϭ͛s ĐhoiĐe aŶd Player Ϯ͛s ĐhoiĐe together. 
You can read the payoffs from the table in this way: 
- If Player 1 choses X and Player 2 chooses X, each player receives 70 points. 
- If Player 1 chooses X and Player 2 chooses Y, Player 1 receives 80 points and Player 2 
receives 30 points. 
- If Player 1 chooses Y and Player 2 chooses X, Player 1 receives 30 points and Player 2 
receives 80 points. 
- If Player 1 chooses Y and Player 2 chooses Y, each player receives 90 points. 
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To make the tables easier to read, the computer will always highlight your payoffs in blue while 
you're making your decisions.  
In each round, the payoffs from your choices (or numbers in the cells) will be DIFFERENT. So 
please carefully read the payoffs from the table in each round before making a choice.  The 
actual tables you will see are all listed on the last page. 
 
Message: 
Player 1 will have the opportunity to send a message to Player 2 after Player 1 makes his 
choice, but before Player 2 takes her action. In the message, Player 1 can indicate which choice 
he made, as well as a suggestion to Player 2 on her action. Player 1 can send one of three 
messages: ͞I have chosen X/Y. You should Đhoose X͟, ͞I haǀe ĐhoseŶ X/Y. You should choose Y,͟ 
or ͞No ŵessage.͟ The selected message will be delivered from Player 1 to Player 2, and then 
Player 2 will make her choice: X or Y. Player 2 will NOT see whether Player 1 chose ͚X͛ or ͚Y͛ 
before she makes her choice. She will only see the message. 
The sequence of Part 3 is as follows: 
1. Player 1 Decision:  Within a pair, Player 1 will make his decision and choose X or Y. This 
choice will not be revealed to Player 2. 
2. Message stage: Player 1 will be given the opportunity to send a message to Player 2, 
where Player 1 can make a statement about the choice he has made and a suggestion to 
Player 2 on what she should choose. Once Player 1 sends this message, it is delivered to 
Player 2. 
3. Player 2 Decision: Player 2 will make her decision and choose X or Y.  
4. New round begins: You will be randomly matched with another participant, and will go 
through this sequence again. You will play a total of 5 rounds. You will stay in the same 
role as Player 1 or Player 2 for all 5 rounds. 
At the end of the 5 rounds, you will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire. 
We will provide the following information about decisions made at the end of the session:your 
partner͛s ĐhoiĐe iŶ eaĐh rouŶd aŶd your payoff iŶ each round. You will not learn your payoffs 
from any round until the very end of the session.  
 
Part 3 Payoffs: 
If Part 3 is chosen for payment, the computer will randomly select 1 of the 5 rounds and the 
points you earn from that round will determine your payment.  Since, there is no way to know 
which round the computer will select, you should make your decision in each round as if it will 
determine your payment. 
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 Final Payment: 
One of the three parts will be randomly picked for payment. You will receive $5 as a show-up 
fee in addition to your earnings from that part. 
The following are the 5 games you will see, one in each round. The computer randomly selects 
one game for every round, so the sequence might not be the same as listed here. In each table 
at least one payoff changes which alters the game. So pay attention and make your decision 
wisely.  
Game 1 
  PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 







  PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 







  PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 
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 Game 4 
  PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 







  PLAYER 2 
PLAYER 1 











 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940770 
